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O U G H T  A N D  IS O N C E  M O R E  
To be and ought to be; that is the question: - whether 'tis nobler in the 
mind to suffer the slings and arrows of  autonomous obligation, or to take 
arms against that sea of troubles and by opposing end them? Ay, there's 
the rub! In Dewey's words, 
The problem of restoring integration and cooperation between man's beliefs 
about the world in which he lives [Ises] and his beliefs about the values and 
purposes that should direct his conduct [Oughts] is the deepest problem of 
modern life. [And] It is the problem of any philosophy that is not isolated 
from that life. 1 
To some it has seemed axiomatic that judgments of obligation and value 
both can and must be derived from judgments about what is; to others 
it has seemed equally certain that they neither can be nor need to be in 
order to be valid since they are intuitively self-evident; still others have 
thought that they cannot be and yet must be if they are to have any 
rational basis, concluding that they are arbitrary and irrational. Each of 
these positions is said by its opponents to puzzle the will and make our 
enterprises turn awry and lose the name of action, and in this paper I 
seek to show that all of  them are mistaken, at least if they are taken in 
certain forms. I begin by describing the three positions more fully. 
The first position I take to hold that judgments of  obligation and value, 
moral or non-moral, can be inferred logically from premises which are 
all factual, whether empirical or non-empirical, and that they cannot be 
regarded as justified unless they can be so inferred from factual premises. 
In its favor various lines of  argument have been or may be advanced, but 
I shall state only the two that seem to me most apposite. 
(1) One, using the parlance of recent philosophy, may be put as follows. 
Factual statements about what is, was, or will be are often given as reasons 
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for judgments of obligation or value. Sometimes they are given as moti- 
vating reasons, as in "You should be nice to your neighbors, because then 
they will be nice to you" or in "Honor  thy father and thy mother, that 
thy days may be long upon the land which the Lord thy God giveth thee." 
But, sometimes, and this is what counts for the matter in hand, they are 
given as justifying reasons, as in "You ought to be grateful to your parents, 
because they have done a great deal for you" or in "Let  us love one 
another, for love is of God."  In fact, as is often pointed out, if one says 
that something is good or ought to be done, then he is in some sense 
claiming that there are reasons for favoring or for doing it, and it is 
hard to see how these reasons could be anything but some fact  about it, 
some proposition about what it is like or will lead to. Thus, if A says 
"X is good" or "Y is wrong," and B asks "Why?," then A may and must 
answer with something like "Because it is pleasant" or "Because it will 
injure someone." In short, an Ought itself virtually claims an Is as its 
ground. One might even say that to justify a judgment of obligation or 
value is to derive it from some judgment of fact which is true or taken 
to be true. 
(2) Another line of argument to show that an Ought can be derived 
from an Is involves the familiar dictum that Ought implies Can. This 
dictum says that if I cannot do something, then I have no obligation to 
do it, even if I would otherwise have one. But, if this is so, then, although 
"I  can" does not imply "I  ought," "I  cannot" does imply "I  do not have 
an obligation." In this sense, a fact about what I cannot do implies 
something about what obligations I have or do not have. To parody 
Emerson: 
So nigh is Ought-to-Be to Is, 
So near is God to man; 
When youth protests aloud, "I  can't ," 
Then Duty says, "You needn't." 
In this use the Ought-implies-Can doctrine is employed to show that 
one does not have a moral obligation in certain cases, but it is assumed 
that we do have such obligations. But the doctrine also has, since Kant  
at least, had a more drastic use. It is sometimes argued that moral obli- 
gation presupposes that the will is free in a contra-causal sense (and even 
that there is a God and that the soul is immortal). I f  this is so, however, 
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then, if the will is not free in that sense (or if there is no God or no immor- 
tality), there can be no moral obligations at all. Then, from an Is of a 
certain sort one can infer the falsity or irrelevance of all moral judgments 
- as has sometimes actually been done. I shall not discuss this line of 
thought, because I am not convinced that morality does have the partic- 
ular presuppositions claimed. I suspect, however, that the inference in- 
volved would turn out not to be a case of going from an Is alone to a 
denial of all moral Oughts, i.e. that the notion of moral obligation would 
appear, not only in its conclusion, but in one of its premises. 
The proponents of the second position admit that justifying (as well as 
motivating) reasons may be given and expected in the case of many at 
least of our judgments of obligation and value, and that such reasons 
involve an appeal to a factual premise, empirical, metaphysical, or theo- 
logical. They insist, however, that, since the statement to be justified is a 
judgment of obligation or value, containing a term like "good"  or"ought ,"  
it cannot be justified unless the reasoning offered implicitly or explicitly 
includes, not only the factual premise mentioned, but also a normative 
premise about what is valuable or ought to be. An Ought, it is held, can 
be validly inferred from an Is only in the presence of a more basic Ought 
taken as a premise; if an Ought or Value term appears in the conclusion 
then it must also appear in one of the premises, when the premises are 
made explicit. Thus, when a factual reason is given as a justification for a 
judgment of obligation or value, as in the examples cited earlier, the 
reasoning is to be construed either as invalid or as an enthymeme; if it 
is to be valid, it must be filled out. Filled out in this way, the reasoning 




We ought to be grateful to those who benefit us, 
Your parents have benefited you, 





We ought to imitate God, 
God is love, 
Therefore, we ought to love. 
Such reasoning, then, is possible if and only if there not only is a factual 
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premise like (b) or (e) but also a more basic Ought premise like (a) or (d). 
These Ought premises themselves may be arrived at by a similar piece of 
reasoning with a still more basic Ought premise, but ultimately our nor- 
mative reasoning must end in an appeal to a most basic Ought premise 
that cannot be established in the same way; it cannot be proved, because 
it cannot be inferred either from another Ought or from an Is or from a 
combination of the two - it must, in fact, be regarded as intuitive or self- 
evident. 
Thomists sometimes say that the basic propositions of Natural Law are 
intuitive or self-evident, as if they were holding this second position, but 
their critics have often interpreted them as subscribing to the first posi- 
tion and have sometimes taken this second position as a ground for re- 
jecting the doctrine of Natural Law. To my mind the Thomist view is 
unclear at this point. It is true that Aquinas says that the first precepts of 
natural law are self-evident, which suggests he is holding the second view. 
But then he explains this as meaning that anyone who knows the defini- 
tion of the subject term in such a precept will see that the predicate of the 
precept is "contained in the notion of the subject."2 That is, in more 
modern language, the precept is analytic. And this suggests that he is 
really maintaining, not the second position, but the first - or, in other 
words, that he is really not an intuitionist but a naturalist in metaethics, 
as will be spelled out shortly. 
As for the third of the positions indicated at the outset - those who 
maintain it agree with the proponents of the second that judgments of 
obligation and value can be justified only by syllogistic reasoning of the 
sort illustrated, that is, only by appeal to a factual premise plus a more 
basic judgment of obligation or value. But where the proponents of the 
second position assert that the most basic judgments of obligation or  
value are intuitive or self-evident, they deny this to be so, and conclude 
that such judgments have no rational standing but are simply arbitrary 
commitments, postulates, or preferences. This third position is nicely 
illustrated by the opening paragraph of an article by Brian Medlin. 
He writes, 
I believe that it is now pretty generally accepted by professional philosophers 
that ultimate ethical principles must be arbitrary. One cannot derive conclusions 
about what should be merely from accounts of what is the case ... To arrive 
at a conclusion in ethics one must have at least one ethical premise. This prem- 
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ise, if it be in turn a conclusion, must be the conclusion of an argument con- 
taining at least one ethical premise. And so we can go back, indefinitely but not 
forever. Sooner or later, we must come to at least one ethical premise which is 
not deduced but baldly asserted. Here we must be a-rational; neither rational 
nor irrational, for here there is no room for reason even to go wrong. 3 
I I  
It  seems clear that, for our purposes, the crucial question in thinking 
about the above three positions is this: can an Ought be logically inferred 
from an Is without using another Ought as a premise, at least implicitly? 4 
Unless we find a fourth view (as I propose to do), if we say yes, we are 
committed some form of the first position, and, if we say no, we must 
choose between the second and third. And if we say no, we must sooner or 
later take account of the two arguments given in favor of the first position. 
Before we can say yes, however, we must find some satisfactory reply to 
the argument based on the "No  Ought from an Is" dictum. This argu- 
ment is a very strong one. Can one who holds the first position meet it in 
any way? There are three ways in which he might seek to do so. (1) One 
is by introducing the possibility that Ought may be defined in terms of 
Is - that "obligation" and "value" can be analyzed into factual or des- 
criptive properties, empirical, metaphysical, or theological. Let us grant 
that one cannot logically infer "I  ought to do A" from "A is commanded 
by God"  or "B is good" from "B is that which all things seek after" 
without any further ado. But, if one can show that "ought"  may be defined 
as meaning "commanded by God"  and "good"  as meaning "sought after 
by all things," then one can validly make the inferences in question. One 
can go from Is to O u g h t / f  one can make out that Good and Ought are 
to be defined in terms of  Is. Spinoza, in effect, saw this when he used 
definitions of  goodness and virtue as premises in proving that "the high- 
est good of the mind is the knowledge of God, and the highest virtue of 
the mind is to know God,"  and that "the highest effort of the mind and 
its highest virtue is to understand things by the third kind of knowledge." 
One may quarrel with his definitions in this connection, and with his 
other premises, but one cannot question his logic, which is simply that of 
geometry. To this extent the "No  Ought from an Is" dictum, so confi- 
dently assumed by those who take the second and third positions, is false. 
For  the following argument is valid: 
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(g) "I ought to do A" means "A is commanded by God" 
(11) A is commanded by God 
(i) Therefore I ought to do A. 
If I accept (g) and (h) then I must accept (i), and there is no problem 
about this because the term "ought," which appears in the conclusion, is 
also present in (g). 
It is quite possible that this line is the one St. Thomas would take. At 
any rate, he places the definition of "good" as meaning "that which all 
things seek after," at the foundation of his entire doctrine of Natural 
Law. He writes, 
Consequently the first principle in the practical reason is one founded on the 
nature of good, viz. that good is that which all things seek after. Hence this is the 
first precept of law, that good is to be done and promoted, and evil is to be avoided. 
All other precepts of the natural law are based upon this ...n 
Here he seems simply to assume that one can go from "X is what all 
things seek after" to "X is to be done and promoted." This, as his critics 
have often pointed out, cannot be done logically without further ado. 
However, if, besides his definition of "good," he were to define what "is 
to be done and promoted" as what we do seek after (or would seek after 
if we knew what we were about), then the logic of his view would be 
clear and could not be faulted, though one might quarrel with his 
proposed definitions. 
(2) The second line of thought by which one might try to sidestep the 
"No Ought from an Is" dictum can only be vaguely sketched here. The 
strength of the dictum lies in the claim that, if one is validly to infer a 
conclusion from a premise, then there must be no terms in the former that 
are not in the latter. But, it might be argued, while this may be true of 
syllogisms and other deductive arguments, there are many inductive 
inferences in ordinary life, in history, and in science of which it is not 
true. Such arguments marshal evidence for their conclusions, for which 
they often claim only probability, and it is not clear that they are "valid" 
only if there are no terms in their conclusions not already in their prem- 
ises or only if they are mediated by definitions. 
(3) It has been suggested by some writers dealing with our problem 
that, besides deductive and inductive logic with their respective canons of 
inference, there may be a third kind of logic for use in reasoning about 
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normative matters, a logic consisting of special rules of inference making 
it possible for an Is to be a reason for an Ought and enabling us to 
infer validly from a factual premise alone to a conclusion about what is 
right or good. In effect, each such rule says that a certain fact is a "good 
reason" (in a non-evaluative sense) for judging that something is good 
or right, or that, if  a certain fact is the case, then one may infer that 
something is good or right. For  instance, one such rule might say that 
from "X will injure someone" one may infer "I  ought not to do X."  
Then, at least in a society in which this rule is accepted, one may validly 
reason as follows: 
(m) X will injure someone. 
(n) Therefore I ought not to do X. 
That is, an Ought can be derived from an Is without the help of  another 
Ought as a premise because there is a valid rule of inference that warrants 
this derivation in certain cases. 
It is not possible to deal adequately with these three lines of thought 
here. For  all their plausibility I am still strongly inclined to think that the 
"No  Ought from an Is" dictum is correct if it is taken as saying that no 
such inference is logically valid. I am not sure line (2) is a sensible one, but 
even if it is correct, it is hard to see how one can use what it says about 
inferences about factual matters in everyday life, history, and science to 
show that it is possible to infer from factual matters to normative ones. 
Line (3), about which I shall say more later, has had hard going to gain 
acceptance, and, in fact, no one has yet worked it out satisfactorily (to 
my mind at least). In any case, there seems to be little difference between 
taking "if  doing X injures someone, then one ought not to do X" as a 
premise and taking it as a rule of inference. It seems to be equally sub- 
stantive either way, and leaves us with the question of  its justification. 
Moreover, if there is a difference between taking it as a premise and 
taking it as a rule of inference, we may still ask why it is to be taken in the 
latter rather than in the former way. Line (1) seems to me correct as far 
as it goes. However, whether it goes far enough to show that one can go 
logically from Is to Ought depends on whether Ought can be satisfacto- 
rily defined in terms of Is, and, while I am less impressed than some by 
the open question argument and the naturalistic fallacy charge so often 
directed against naturalistic and other definists (metaphysical or theo- 
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logical), I nevertheless doubt that judgments of obligation and value can 
be translated without serious loss into factual or existential ones of 
whatever sort. In any ease, it seems to me that even if, for example, 
" ' good '  means 'aimed at by all things '"  is a correct definition of what we 
actually mean by "good,"  one can only accept it as a definition for use in 
thinking about and deciding what to do if one already accepts the norma- 
tive judgment that what is aimed at by all things is good. If  this is so, then, 
in effect, what looks like a definition is tantamount to a value principle, 
and, if this is so, then we are still left with the problem of  its justification 
and, in particular, of  its relation to beliefs about what is. 7 
I I I  
Of the three positions originally distinguished, the first says that all 
Oughts can be directly inferred from some Is or other, and that such 
inferences are logically valid. The other two insist that no Ought can be 
logically inferred from any Is except with the help of another Ought taken 
as a premise, and that the most basic Oughts are therefore logically auto- 
nomous with respect to Is (as Plato said, the Good is beyond Being). In 
these terms, it seems to me, for the reasons indicated, that the second and 
third positions are correct in maintaining that there is no logical error in 
refusing to go from any Is whatsoever to any Ought - and that the propo- 
nents of  the first position cannot rescue themselves by any of the three 
lines of thought just discussed. Does it follow, as so many have thought, 
that we must regard basic judgments of obligation or value as either self- 
evident or arbitrary? Discussing this question J. S. Mill wrote, 
Questions of ultimate ends are not amenable to direct proof..., we are not, 
however, to infer that [the] acceptance or rejection [of an ultimate end] must 
depend on blind impulse, or arbitrary choice. There is a larger meaning of the 
word "proof," in which this question is ... amenable to it .... The subject is 
within the cognizance of the rational faculty; and neither does that faculty deal 
with it solely in the way of intuition. Considerations may be presented capable 
of determining the intellect either to give or withhold it s assent to the doctrine; 
and this is equivalent to proof. 8 
Here MiU is claiming that, even if basic normative principles and value 
judgments cannot be proved by being inferred from true factual premises 
according to logically valid procedures, and also are not seen to be true 
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by intuition, they are still not arbitrary or irrational; it may still be 
possible to advance factual considerations which make it rational or 
reasonable, though not logically necessary, to give one's assent to such a 
principle or value. That is, even if one cannot logically infer an Ought 
from an Is, one may yet be rational and justified in doing so, and un- 
reasonable otherwise, at least in certain cases. One such case, I take it, is 
his famous, much-criticized "proof"  of hedonism. Here Mill is not pre- 
tending that "Pleasure is the good" follows logically from "We all desire 
pleasure as an end and (basically) only pleasure" (he explicitly says he is 
not); he is arguing that, since we do all aim at pleasure in this way, it 
would be absurd or unreasonable, in a "larger" sense than that defined 
by logic, to deny that pleasure is the good. 9 
Mill seems to me to be on the right track here in suggesting that there is 
a sense in which one can go from Is to Ought - a sense in which such a 
process may be rational, reasonable, or justified, even if it is not logical. 1~ 
Let me try to indicate why by considering two examples. Take first the 
following bit of conversation: 
Him: You ought to go downtown today. 
Me: Why? 
Him: There is a sale on. You want to buy a new suit, don't  
you? 
In this bit of talk an ought-judgment is made, though not a moral one, 
and it is defended or justified by the use of two statements of fact, without 
the use of a normative premise, in a manner that seems entirely natural 
and reasonable. To state the "practical inference" involved more accu- 
rately, it is this: 
(a) You want to buy a new suit at a reasonable price. 
(b) There is a sale on downtown today. 
(c) Therefore you ought to go downtown today. 
It might be replied that this inference is justified or reasonable only if 
another premise is understood, namely, 
(d) If  you want to buy a new suit at a reasonable price, you ought 
to adopt the means suited to accomplish that end. 
In other words, one needs a further premise with an Ought in it. But, in 
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return, I am tempted to say that adducing this premise is a work of logi- 
cal supererogation; the inference is really quite rational without it. It is 
not like: 
Socrates is a man, 
Therefore Socrates is mortal, 
which does dearly need an additonal premise. One cannot possibly claim 
that the meaning o f "mor t a l "  is such that, if Socrates is a man, then one 
may correctly go on to say that he is mortal. One has no language-rule 
connecting "man"  and "mortal"  and hence one needs a premise that does 
SO. 
Von Wright seems to think that the inference in the case cited is justi- 
fied only if  "You ought to . . ."  is taken to mean "Unless you do, you will 
fail to . . ." i.e. only if  "You ought . . ." is taken to be a kind of  factual 
statement. But this is because he assumes that a practical inference must 
be logically valid in order to be justified, and this is just what is in question. 
It may be that it simply is linguistically appropriate to introduce "ought"  
into the conclusion even i f  it does not have von Wright's meaning (viz., 
you will fail if you don't  do ...) and does not appear in any of the prem- 
ises - just because I am there wanting to buy a new suit cheap (and 
because the speaker has a pro-attitude toward my doing so). 11 
Consider now a similar example, entirely in the first person: here I am, 
wanting to buy a new suit at a reasonable price. I read an advertisement 
of a sale on suits and decide that I should go downtown today if at all 
possible. One could try to set this practical inference up as follows, as 




I want to buy a new suit at a reasonable price 
There is a suit sale on downtown. 
Therefore I ought to go downtown today. 
Now, first of all, what I said about the previous example will all apply 
to this one. But the point I wish to stress is this. If  I am actually conclu- 
ding that I shouM go downtown today if possible, I must not merely 
believe that I want to buy a new suit reasonably, I must be wanting a new 
suit at a reasonable price, and, if I am wanting this, then I may reason- 
ably pass (and only then) from the fact that there is a sale on suits down- 
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town to the conclusion that I should go downtown if possible - without 
any further ado in the way of definitions, additonal Ought premises, rules 
of inference, etc. - simply because "I  should . . ." is the appropriate form 
of expression to use when one has an interest and apprehends facts that 
are relevant to it. What makes the judgment that I should go downtown 
today a rational or justifiable one is just such facts as that there is a sale 
on, plus my desiring to buy a new suit at a bargain price. 
What I suggest is that the sort of thing that is true in this rather simple 
case is true in all cases: i.e. (a) that always, when a piece of practical 
reasoning seems reasonable and justified, there is present both a factual 
premise or reason and something that may be called an attitude, interest, 
or point of view and involves, not just believing a proposition, but being 
for or against something (it may be an ordinary desire, self-love, "the 
farmer's point of view," etc. ; in the ease of moral judgment and reasoning 
it is "the moral point of view," however that may be defined); (b) that if 
one has an interest or takes a point of view and then finds or believes that 
certain relevant facts obtain (that is, facts bearing on that interest or 
point of view), then one may rationally and justifiably, at least in prin- 
ciple, proceed to a normative conclusion, even if the inference is not 
strictly according to logical Hoyle (whether it is justified in practice will 
depend on what the facts appealed to are, whether other interests or 
points of view are affected, etc.). In fact, while I am less sure of (a) than of 
(b), I submit that the use of a statement involving some term like "ought"  
or "good" in a first-hand normative way is appropriate precisely in such 
a context and only in such a context. Normative discourse just is the 
appropriate discourse in which to express oneself when one is taking 
some conative point of view and apprehends facts relevant to it. 
What I have said is not intended to deny Mrs. Foot's contention that 
one cannot well agree that Jones is causing offence by indicating lack of 
respect and yet deny that Jones is rude - that is, that one may justifiably 
go from "Jones is causing offence by indicating lack of respect" to "Jones 
is r u d e " -  even when "Jones is rude" is used evaluatively, as it usually is. 13 
I do want to claim, however, that this inference from an Is to an Ought 
is justified only if it is made in the presence of a concern that people 
refrain from doing the sort of thing Jones is doing - the sort of concern 
that is normally present when people are said to be rude. I f  I am utterly 
indifferent, I cannot properly say he is rude. 
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IV 
If this view of the matter is correct, then there is a sense, though not a 
strietlylogical one, in which one may go from an Is to an Ought in certain 
contexts, and the context need not consist of another Ought taken as a 
premise (as the second and third positions allege). So far the first of our 
original three positions is well-taken. But the other two positions are also 
welt-taken in so far as they maintain that going from an Is to an Ought is 
not warranted by deductive or inductive logic, nor by the rules of a 
third logic, nor by the possibility that Ought may be defined in terms of 
Is. The truth, if I am right, belongs to a fourth position, which preserves 
what is viable in the other three but rejects their common assumption 
that a rational inference must be a "logically" valid one. In particular, it 
should be noticed that this fourth position has most of the virtues claimed 
for the "third logic" or "good reasons" view, without being open to the 
same criticisms. (It may even represent what the proponents of that view 
have been fishing for.) 
The similarities and dissimilarities of the three positions I have rejected 
and the nature of the fourth position I am proposing may be indicated 





Judgments of obligation and value (Oughts) are rationally 
justifiable, objectively valid, etc. 
Judgments of obligation and value (Oughts) cannot be logi- 
cally inferred from factual ones (Ises). 
Judgments of obligation and value (Oughts) cannot be ration- 
ally justified, objectively valid, etc., unless they can be 
logically inferred from factual ones (Ises). 
Basic judgments of obligation and value are intuitive, self- 
evident, self-justifying. 
The first position affirms (1) and (3) and denies (2) and (4). The second 
affirms (1), (2) and (4) and denies (3). The third affirms (2) and (3) and 
denies (1) and (4). The first and second positions agree on (1), the second 
and third on (2), and the first and third on (3). Only the second position 
asserts (4). These three positions have this in common: they all assume 
that there is no reasonable or rationally justified way of going from Is to 
Ought unless there is a logically valid way of doing so. They all assume, 
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even the third-logic people, that every rational or justifiable passage of  
thought must be warranted by some canon of inference - that the whole 
business must be captured in the logical machinery of "premises," "rules 
of inference," and "conclusions," if it is to be a rational or objectively 
justified transition of mind. What I am suggesting, by way of contrast, is 
that these assumptions, which are made even by such perceptive moral 
philosophers as Hampshire and Aiken, are mistaken - that we both do 
and should regard some inferences or transitions of thought as rational 
or justified even though the "conclusion" is an Ought, the only "premise" 
is an Is, and there is no "rule of  inference." The resulting fourth position 
toward which I have been working, then, asserts (I) and (2) and denies 
(3) and (4). 
In objection to this fourth position it may be argued (a) that we do 
not actually recognize such inferences as those just described as justified 
or reasonable, (b) that we ought not do so now, even if we have been. The 
first contention is simply false, as my suit-sale example shows. As for the 
second - if we do recognize such passages of  thought as rational, this 
fact is, so far, a good reason for continuing to do so, and I do not see 
that there are any over-riding reasons why we should not. As long as we 
are shaping our attitudes, points of view, and normative judgments 
clearheadedly in the light of the fullest relevant knowledge and insight, I 
see no reason for refusing to call the transitions of thought in question 
justified or rational. Commenting on C. L. Stevenson's views about 
validity, H. D. Aiken writes, 
Thus, for example, although Professor Charles Stevenson is perhaps more sen- 
sitive than any other philosopher to the reality of persuasive definition, he him- 
self falls into it when he refuses, for no reason sanctioned by ordinary language, 
to accept the possibility that there are any "rational methods" other than those 
of formal logic and science. Although he freely allows the right of moralists to 
use, inter alia, what he regards as rational methods when they happen to be 
appropriate for the purpose of "irrigating" ethical judgments, he nevertheless 
insists there are no criteria of validity with respect to ethical disputation as such. 
But why should he fear lest the notion of "validity" be extended so as to include 
forms of inference which are neither demonstrative nor inductive? As he him- 
self wisely says, "When an inference does not purport to comply with the usual 
rules, any insistence on its failure to do so is gratuitous." And yet he maintains, 
to my mind quite unconvincingly, that it is "wholly impracticable and injudi- 
Cious" (sic) to sanction a definition of validity which extends its usage beyond 
its applications to logic and to science. Apart from a tenacious desire to reserve 
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the emotive meaning of such expressions as "rational" and "valid" for pro- 
cesses of reasoning involved in formal logic and inductive science, what is there 
to commend Stevenson's position? la 
Extended to cover the third-logic people as well as Stevenson (and possi- 
bly Aiken himself), this seems to me just the right thing to say. 
It will help to make the view I am proposing dearer if I comment on 
another passage from Aiken at this point. Shortly after the one just 
quoted he goes on to say, 
Now I agree once and for all that there are no formal logical rules by means of 
which one can deduce the ethical proposition "x ought to be done" from any 
combination of purely factual statements. What I do maintain is that, according 
to ordinary usage, it is entirely permissible to infer ethical conclusions from 
factual premises. I should now like to support this contention with some 
examples. Suppose that it could be shown that a certain act would cause another 
person unnecessary hardship or suffering; I think that any normal person in 
our society would regard this as a good, if not sufficient, reason for inferring 
that, other things remaining equal, the act in question ought not to be per- 
formed. Again, suppose it could be shown that the fulfillment of a certain 
promise would probably cause the person to whom one made it to destroy 
himself; here also, I think that normal persons would, perhaps reluctantly, 
conclude from this that the promise ought to be broken. Other examples come 
to mind. 
I conclude from this that, however difficult they may be to specify, there are 
nevertheless broad principles of relevance or valid inference in moral discourse 
which enable us, in certain circumstances, to infer ethical conclusions from 
nonethical premises. But I do not in the least wish to imply by this that the 
ordinary laws of logic should be amended or broadened. Such laws have no 
immediate application to the kinds of inference in question. My contention is 
merely that within the universe of discourse called "moral" or "ethical," certain 
types of inference are viewed as reasonable, others not. Nor do I wish to say 
that moral judgments may be "logically derived" from nonethical statements 
of fact. I think, nothing is gained from such an unnecessary and really misleading 
extension of the expression "logical derivation." All that needs defending is the 
thesis that moral reasoning has its own proprieties which, while certainly not 
written into the starry heavens above, are at least constant and extensive enough 
to enable the members of a given civilization to distinguish a good reason from 
a bad one. 15 
Here Aiken is defending the good reasons theory referred to above, 
though without adopting the notion of  a third logic. Now, I agree with 
him, of course, when he says that there are no formal logical rules by 
which we may pass from nonethical statements of  fact to moral judgments, 
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and again when he says that ordinary usage permits us to go from factual 
premises to ethical conclusions, or that within the universe of  discourse 
called "moral"  or "ethical," certain types of  inference are viewed as 
reasonable and others not, and yet again when he argues that we ought 
not to call such inferences "logical" even in an extended sense. But, while 
he does not choose to call them rules of a third logic, Aiken does think 
of  these inferences as resting on quasi-logical "proprieties" or "principles 
of  relevance or valid inference" which play a role in moral discourse ana- 
logous to that of logical rules of inference rather than to that of premises. 
This conception he supports with two examples, and I agree that "any 
normal person in our society" would regard it as reasonable to draw the 
conclusions indicated in these examples. It is, however, not clear to me 
that the principles of not causing unnecessary hardship or suffering and 
of  not causing others to commit suicide function in our thinking as 
rules of inference rather than as premises (if there is a difference). If  they 
are functioning as implicit premises, then these examples are not cases of  
inferring from factual premises to ethical conclusions, as Aiken thinks 
they are. But suppose that they are not functioning as premises. It does not 
follow that they are functioning as "rules of  inference." For a third anal- 
ysis is possible. This is that what carries the "normal member of  our 
society" from the factual premises involved to his ethical conclusion - 
and does so reasonably - is not necessarily any Ought premise, nor any 
rule of  inference, but simply his moral concern for others, his sympathy, 
or his commitment to the moral point of  view. What I wish to suggest, 
then, is that, when we go from Is to Ought with a sense of reasonableness 
or justification, we are doing so because we (or someone we are speaking 
to or of) have an operative concern or interest - not because we have any 
hidden Ought premises or any special rules of  inference that have a 
quasi-logical status. 16 1 would even like to say that, ultimately, all of  our 
Oughts, even those we sometimes use as premises (or perhaps as rules of 
inference,/fwe do so use them) are generated by or accepted in the pres- 
ence of  some concern or interest in confrontation with some apprehen- 
sion of fact, and that this process may be entirely reasonable even if 
it is not logical (perhaps even logical norms are generated or accepted 
in the same way!) Just now, however, I want only to contend that 
some "inferences" from Is to Ought are justified or rational even if they 
use no rules of  inference and no suppressed Ought premises, just because 
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words like "ought"  and "good" are linguistically appropriate in such 
contexts, iv And, when I say these "inferences" are justified (other things 
being equal), I am claiming that any rational being who shares the same 
concern or point of view will accept them. 
It should be observed that this fourth view could be accepted, if not 
by St. Thomas and his followers, then at least by some near-cousins. 
Suppose that one wishes to associate judgments of  obligation and value 
with man's "natural tendency" to happiness or self-fulfillment, as J. D. 
Wild does. la Then one need not define "X is good" or "I  ought to do Y" 
as meaning "X is conducive to the fulfillment of man's natural tendency" 
or "Y is required for that fulfillment." One need not be a naturalist (or 
ontological definist) of this sort, as Wild seems to be. One might contend 
instead that a judgment of obligation or value is an expression of the 
conatus in question, made in the presence of facts taken to be relevant to 
it, not an assertion to the effect that one has that conatus or that those 
facts are relevant to it. Then one would have a view - a non-cognitive one 
- which would be much like that of the Thomists, but which would be 
compatible with the one I have been sketching. 
However this may be, one could even, if one wished, combine the view 
sketched with a belief that "good" and "ought"  can be satisfactorily 
defined along such lines as have been variously suggested by St. Thomas, 
Spinoza, J. D. Wild, S. C. Pepper, R. B. Perry, H. R. Niebuhr, and others. 
One might then still accept such definitions, but, if I am right, one would 
have to recognize that underlying one's acceptance of the definitions 
there is or should be an attitude, interest, or point of view already taken - 
i.e. that the definition is really a crystallization in a certain mode (formal 
or material) of an attitude, interest, or point of view. The definition would 
then not necessarily be vitiated by this fact, but the fact would have to be 
recognized and kept in mind in a way in which it has not usually been by 
naturalists and other definists. For what would then really mediate the 
inference from Is to Ought or from Fact to Value would not be the defini- 
tion but the underlying commitment. 
V 
At the opening of Section I, I described two lines of argument for the  
position that an Ought can and must be derived from an Is. i t  will be clear 
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at once that the view taken in  Section III comports weU with the first of 
them. For it agrees that factual premises (Ises) may be reasons for Oughts, 
and it explains why this is so (as Hume insisted one must). But something 
must be said about the second - the one using the "Ought implies Can" 
dictum. Can its point be provided for? This point is that "I  cannot" im- 
plies "I  have no obligation to." The problem is that the use of the word 
"implies" suggests that there is a logical connection between a statement 
about what is (cannot be) and one about what obligations we have or do 
not have. This suggestion I believe to be misleading. The conviction that, 
if A is unable to do B, then he has no obligation to do B, and the convic- 
tion that if C was unable to do D, then he is to be excused for not doing 
D - these convictions of moral common sense are, in my opinion, not 
really logical truths. What  they mean is something like this: that if A is 
unable to do B, then he should not be held to doing it, and that if C was 
unable to do D, then he should not be blamed or punished for not doing 
it. In other words, what appear to be logical truths are really normative 
principles. They do not give us logical warrants for going from Is to 
Ought - or rather from Cannot-do to Have-No-Obligation-to-do. Instead 
they tell us that it is not morally permissible to holdpeople responsible 
for what they cannot do, at least if it is not their fault that they cannot 
do it. In a sense they enable us to go from Cannot-do to Have-No-Obli- 
gation-to-do, but they do so only because they are expressions of the moral 
point of view to which we are already committed (if we accept them at 
all). Hence, a recognition of such principles does not contravene the 
view proposed. 
This line of thought is supported b y  another to which I am inclined, 
namely, that the "can" in "Ought implies can" has a normative meaning. 
"Can"  does, of course, have a factual sense, e.g. in the sentence, "I  can 
jump two feet but I cannot jump 26 feet." But does it have such a purely 
factual sense in a typical moral case? J. W. Smith and others have sug~ 
gested that it does not and I think I agree with them. 19 Suppose that 
someone is on his way to a meeting that he has an obligation to attend, 
but breaks his leg on the way (not purposely, of course). He and the rest 
of us would then regard him as absolved from the obligation to attend the 
meeting (though possibly not from the obligation to notify us) on the 
ground that he is unable to make it. But, of course, strictly speaking, as 
Smith points out, he could make it, even if only by crawling and dragging 
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his leg painfully behind him. When we agree that he "can ' t "  make it - or 
"couldn ' t  have" made it - we are not strictly saying he "can ' t "  or 
"couldn ' t  have"  in the factual sense. We are saying something more like 
" I t  would be unreasonable or wrong to expect h im to attend the meeting 
under the circumstances." I f  this is so, then, in going f rom " C a n ' t "  to 
" H a s  no obligation to ,"  we are not strictly going f rom a pure Is to a con- 
clusion about  an obligation. We are going f rom something like " I t  would 
be wrong to expect . . ."  to " H e  has no obligation to . . ."  
One might reply that  our judgment,  " i t  would be wrong to expect . . . ," 
is based on a purely factual premise, namely, in our example, that  our 
friend would suffer great pain if he were to attend the meeting, so that  we 
are still going f rom Is to Ought, or rather Ought not. This is true, but 
this particular inference may be dealt with in the same way as any argu- 
ment  in which a factual premise is given as a reason for a normative 
judgment,  and so has already been covered by our discussion. 
v I  
One final remark - in approaching the subject as I have, I have been 
talking as if  there were a fairly clear distinction between the Is and the 
Ought. Actually, as is well-known, there are all sorts of  complexities 
and difficulties in defining that  distinction - witness discussions by J. L 
Austin, John Seafle, Dorothy  Emmet,  and many  others. I t  seems reason- 
able to hope, however, that  my view would survive even if it were to 
turn out that  no clear or workable distinction between the Is and the 
Ought can be made. Perhaps it would seem more plausible then. 
NOTES 
1 John Dewey, The Quest for Certainty (1929), p. 255. 
2 See Summa Theologica, I-II, Quest. 94, art. 2, or Basic Writings of  Saint Thomas 
Aquinas, ed. by A. C. Pegis (t945), II, p. 774. 
a "Ultimate Principles and Ethical Egoism," Australasian Journal of  Philosophy, 35 
(1957), p. 111. 
a Throughout this paper I take Oughts to include judgments about what is desirable, 
good, or valuable as well as judgments about what is right or obligatory. 
5 Ethics, Bk. IV, Prop. xxviii; Bk. V, Prop. xxv. 
Loe. eit. 
Here cf. my Ethics (1963), pp. 80-85. 
8 Utilitarianism, near end of Ch. I. 
532 
O U G H T  AND IS ONCE MORE 
9 My interpretation of Epicurus and Mill in "The Naturalistic Fallacy," Mind (48), 
1939, was simply mistaken, as was my interpretation of Hume. For Mill's own rejection 
of such an interpretation, see loc. cit. and the opening of Ch. IV, 
10 "Not  logical" does not mean or imply "illogical"; it includes what is "neither logic- 
al nor illogical." 
11 Cf. G. H. von Wright, "Practical Inference," Philosophical Review, LXXII (1963), 
pp. 159-179, and Max Black's comments in "The Gap between 'Is' and 'Should' ," ibid., 
LXXVIII (1964), pp. 170 f. Black's own view in this article is very close to the view 
I am proposing here, but, I think, somewhat less dear. About such views R. M. Hare 
remarks ("The Promising Game," "Revue Internationale de Philosophie, 70 (1964), 
p. 398n) that they set a lower "moral tone" than that of John Searle. In reply I am 
tempted to quote the old song: 
You take the high road, and I 'll  take the low road. 
But, of course, the real point is that not all "shoulds" and "oughts" are moral, and a 
general theory, which Searle's is not, must apply to them all. For other indications of 
my general theory see op. cit., pp. 94-96, and "On Saying the Ethical Thing," Proc. and 
Addresses of  the American Philosophical Assoeiation, XXXIX (1966), 21-42. 
12 Loc. cit. 
x8 Philippa Foot, "Moral Arguments," MindLXVII(1958), 502-513. 
14 Reason and Conduct (1962), p. 62. 
15 Ibid., pp. 63f. 
16 In the case of institutional Oughts such as Searle discusses in "How to Derive 
'Ought' from 'Is ' ,"  Phil. Rev., 73 (1964), 43-58, I would say that the inference, if 
justified at all, is mediated by a commitment to the institution in question and its rules. 
Cf. A. I. Melden, Rights and Right Conduct (1959) and "Reasons for Action and 
Matters of Fact," Proc. and Add. of  Am. Philos. Assoc., XXXV (1961), 45-60; P. Foot, 
Theories of  Ethics (1967), pp. l l f ;  H. Ofstad and L. Bergstrom, "A note on Searle's 
Derivation of 'Ought '  from 'Is ' ,"  lnquiry, 8 (1965), pp. 309-314. 
1~ This does not necessarily imply that "ought" and "good"  are definable in "non- 
ethical" terms. 
is Cf. Plato's Modern Enemies and the Theory of  Natural Law (1953). 
19 Cf. J. W. Smith, "Impossibility and Morals," Mind, LXX (1961). 
533 
